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(RE)EMBRACING SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY THEORY AS A BASIS FOR 







Dave Egger’s fictional book The Circle tells the story of an all-powerful new media 
company of the same name that seeks to totally monopolise its market and remake the 
world in its image. To achieve this The Circle advocates the unregulated sharing of all 
information, at all times, regardless of its source and irrespective of the consequences 
for individuals, society and the state. Although the dystopian view of reality presented 
by the book is perhaps slightly extreme, it does not take any great leap of faith to see 
how we could all end up as ‘Circlers’, particularly because the underlying normative 
rationale that drives The Circle is what currently underpins online speech in reality. 
Libertarianism and the inherently libertarian argument from truth and marketplace of 
ideas have historically underpinned the notion of the Fourth Estate and have a ‘hold’ 
on First Amendment jurisprudence. In recent years, libertarianism has emerged as the 
de facto normative paradigm for Internet and social media speech worldwide. 
Although the theory’s dominant position fits with the perceived ethos of social media 
platforms such as Facebook, its philosophical foundations are based on nineteenth and 
early twentieth century means of communication. Consequently, as illustrated by 
issues such as filter bubbles and Facebook’s reaction to fake news (bringing in a 
third-party fact checking company), which conflicts with the platform’s libertarian 
ideology, as well as the European Court of Human Rights consistently placing the 
argument from democracy at the heart of its Article 10 ECHR jurisprudence, rather 
than the argument from truth and marketplace of ideas, this normative framework is 
idealistic as opposed to being realistic. Therefore, it is not suitable for twenty-first 
century free speech, and the modern media, of which social media is no longer an 
outlier, but a central component. Thus, this paper advances the argument that a 
normative and philosophical framework for media speech, based on social 
responsibility theory and the argument from democratic self-governance, is more 
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suitable for the modern media than libertarianism. Further, it justifies a coercive 
regulatory regime that also preserves media freedom. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper begins at section 2 by introducing libertarianism’s position as the 
dominant communication theory for free speech generally and the de facto normative 
paradigm for online speech. Based on analysis of the argument from truth and the 
marketplace of ideas section 3 advances the argument that libertarianism should be 
rejected as a normative communication paradigm, particularly in the context of the 
modern media within which the Internet and social media are no longer outliers of 
free speech, but are central to how we impart and receive information and ideas. This 
leads on to section 4 in which it is argued that the social responsibility communication 
theory should be re-embraced as a normative paradigm. It argues that this theory, 
combined with the argument from democratic self-governance, provides a more 
suitable normative and philosophical framework for the modern media than 
libertarianism. This is because the framework not only rights a number of issues 
created by libertarianism, but also justifies a coercive regulatory regime for the media 
that also preserves media freedom. 
 
2. INTRODUCING LIBERTARIANISM: THE DE FACTO NORMATIVE 
PARADIGM FOR FREE SPEECH? 
 
Early libertarians such as John Milton1 and John Erskine2 argued that if individuals 
could be freed from restrictions on communication, people would ‘naturally’ follow 
                                                          
* Barrister and Associate, Anthony Collins LLP; Research Associate, Institute of Advanced Legal 
Studies Information Law & Policy Centre, University of London; Associate Academic Member, 
Cornwall Street Chambers; Door Tenant, East Anglian Chambers. Formerly, Senior Lecturer in Law, 
Aston Law School, Aston University (UK). This article was presented as a paper at ‘Joining the Circle: 
capturing the zeitgeist of ‘Big Tech’ companies, social media speech and privacy’ conference, Inner 
Temple, 23rd May 2018. The author would like to thank Dr Paul Wragg (University of Leeds), Dr 
András Koltay (Pázmány Péter Catholic University) and Professor Tom Gibbons (University of 
Manchester) for comments on earlier drafts of this article. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1 Milton’s Areopagitica, which was published in 1644 provided strong libertarian arguments against 
authoritarian controls of free speech and the press and for intellectual freedom. Milton’s tract laid down 
the self-righting process, which underpins libertarianism and is enshrined within the marketplace of 
ideas theory. J. Milton, Areopagitica, (Clarendon Press Series, Leopold Classic Library, 2016). 
2 Some fifty years after Milton published Areopagitica, John Erskine advanced the libertarian 
principles of freedom of speech and of the press in defence of publishers accused of violating the law. 
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the dictates of their conscience, seek truth, engage in public debate and, consequently, 
create a better life for themselves and others.3 In applying the theory to the modern 
media, from a ‘pure’ libertarian perspective, according to Merrill, it should be 
characterised by ‘uncontrolled, full, unregulated laissez-faire journalism – with a clear 
separation of State and [media].’4 In Merrill’s view, freedom should be the underlying 
moral principle of any press theory: ‘[t]here is a basic faith, shown by libertarian 
advocates, that a free press – working in a laissez-faire, unfettered situation – will 
naturally result in a pluralism of information and viewpoints necessary in a 
democratic society.’5  
 
In the context of online and social media speech, this correlates closely with the 
view of cyber-libertarians who, according to Nemes, ‘…argue that the harm in 
regulating online speech is greater than the harm caused by the online speech’6 and 
‘…favour an archaic, unregulated Internet free from state control, fearing that 
regulation will stifle Internet development and associated freedoms.’7 Echoing these 
sentiments, in The Circle, we are told that ‘…life will be better, will be perfect, when 
everyone has unfettered access to everyone and everything they know…all 
information, personal or not, should be known by all.’8 Although perhaps not as 
extreme, in ‘real life’ in late 2016, Mark Zuckerberg reiterated that Facebook simply 
distributes content created by its users, using an impersonal and objective algorithm.9 
In his view, the social network is essentially a platform for others to disseminate 
speech, and nothing more, and is certainly not a censor or arbiter of truth.10   
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
See: T. Howell, A Complete Collection of State Trials London: 1704, Volume 22 (T.C. Howard, 1817), 
414. 
3 S. Baran and D. Davis, Mass Communication Theory: Foundations, Ferment and Future (7th ed, 
Wadsworth Publishing, 2014), 63. 
4 J. Merrill, The imperative of freedom: A philosophy of journalistic autonomy (Freedom House, 1990), 
11. 
5 ibid. 35.  
6 I. Nemes, ‘Regulating Hate Speech in Cyberpsace: issues of Desirability and Efficacy’, Information 
& Communication Technology Law Vol. 11, No. 3, 2002, 196.   
7 ibid. 199. See also: B. Leiter, ‘Clearing Cyber-Cesspools: Google and Free Speech’ in S. Levmore 
and M. Nussbaum, The Offensive Internet (Harvard University Press, 2010), 156; J. Bartlett, The Dark 
Net (Random House, 2014), 8-9. 
8 D. Eggers, The Circle (Penguin, 2013), 483-484. 
9 M. Ingram, ‘Mark Zuckerberg Finally Admits Facebook Is a Media Company’, www.fortune.com, 
23rd December 2016 http://fortune.com/2016/12/23/zuckerberg-media-company/; M. Ingram,  
‘Facebook’s Claim That it Isn’t a Media Company Is Getting Harder to Swallow’ www.fortune.com, 
15th December 2016 http://fortune.com/2016/12/15/facebook-media-claim/ both accessed 7th July 2017.  
10 ibid.  
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The underlying principles in The Circle’s mission and Zuckerberg’s statement 
are aligned to libertarianism, which dictates that free speech is an intrinsic natural 
right that individuals are born with and, therefore, it is absolute, as it does not 
propagate duties and responsibilities that attach to the right to free speech and, by 
extension, in a European context at least, media freedom. 11  From an Anglo-American 
perspective, the theory and, as discussed below, the arguments advanced by 
proponents such as John Milton, John Erskine, John Stuart Mill, Thomas Jefferson12 
and Justice Holmes, have served to support the traditional notion of the Fourth 
Estate.13 In the US, the theory was made an explicit and foundational tenet of 
democracy, as it is enshrined within the First Amendment, 14 pursuant to which 
‘Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.’15 
Central to the influence of libertarianism on free speech has been Milton’s self-
righting process, Mill’s argument from truth and, in particular, Justice Holmes’ 
marketplace of ideas theory,16 that was laid down in Abrams v United States.17 This 
theory encapsulates the self-righting process as it is based on the premise that ‘truth’, 
                                                          
11 Although Article 10(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights does not specifically provide 
for protection of media freedom in distinction to that of private individuals and non-media institutions, 
in interpreting Article 10, the European Court of Human Rights has attached great importance to the 
role of the media. For example, see: Bladet Tromso and Stensaas v Norway (2000) 29 EHRR 125, [59]; 
Bergens Tidande v Norway (2001) 31 EHRR 16, [48]; Busuioc v Moldova (2006) 42 EHRR 14, [64]-
[65]; Jersild v Denmark (1995) 19 EHRR 1; Janowski v Poland (No 1) (2000) 29 EHRR 705, [32]. 
Compare with the position in the United States where the US Supreme Court has consistently resisted 
arguments that the free press clause ‘or of the press’ in the First Amendment to the US Constitution 
creates a similar distinction to that provided by the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court. For example, 
see: majority decision in Citizens United v FEC 130 S Ct, 905. For detailed analysis see: P. Coe, 
‘Redefining 'media' using a 'media-as-a-constitutional-component' concept: An evaluation of the need 
for the European Court of Human Rights to alter its understanding of 'media' within a new media 
landscape’, Legal Studies (2017) Vol. 37, No. 1, 25-53, 49. 
12 Jefferson, during his Presidency, consistently emphasised the theory in his defence of freedom of the 
press. For example, see: A. Lipscomb (ed), T. Jefferson, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, (Memorial 
Edition, Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1904, Vol. 11), 32-34. 
13 D. Weiss, ‘Journalism and Theories of the Press’ in S. Littlejohn and K. Foss (eds), Encyclopedia of 
Communication Theory Volume 2, (Sage, 2009), 574-579, 576. See Chapter One, section 3.1 for an 
explanation of the meaning of ‘Fourth Estate’. 
14 ibid; P. Plaisance, ‘The Mass Media as Discursive Network: Building on the Implications of 
Libertarian and Communitarian Claims for New Media Ethics Theory’ Communication Theory 15(3) 
2005, 292-313, 295. 
15 Consequently, US Supreme Court decisions have consistently defended media freedom from 
government intervention and regulation based on libertarian ideology. For example, see: New York 
Times v Sullivan 376 US 254 (1964); New York Times v United States 403 US 713 (1971). See 
generally: P. Stewart J, ‘Or of the Press’, (1975) 26 Hastings Law Journal 631; Chapter Two, section 
2. 
16 See: S. Baran and D. Davis, Mass Communication Theory: Foundations, Ferment and Future (7th ed, 
Wadsworth Publishing, 2014), 68; D. Weiss, ‘Journalism and Theories of the Press’ in S. Littlejohn 
and K. Foss (eds), Encyclopedia of Communication Theory Volume 2, (Sage, 2009), 574-579, 577; F. 
Siebert, T. Peterson and W. Schramm, Four Theories of the Press, (University of Illinois Press, 1956), 
44-45. 
17 250 US 616 (1919). 
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or the ‘best’ ideas, will win out, as they will naturally emerge from the competition of 
ideas in the marketplace.18 Thus, as Barendt observes:  
 
‘It is almost impossible to exaggerate the central hold of the “market-
place of ideas” metaphor on US jurisprudence and general thinking about 
the First Amendment freedom of speech. From it stems the belief that the 
best corrective for the expression of pernicious opinion is not regulation, 
let alone suppression, but more speech. Truth, it is said, will emerge from 
the competition of ideas in the market-place…This is the central tradition 
of US free speech jurisprudence…it is now taken quite literally as the 
appropriate framework for First Amendment jurisprudence.’19 
 
Indeed, it is because of Mill’s argument from truth, and the introduction by 
Justice Holmes of the marketplace of ideas that libertarian free speech ideology 
continued to thrive in the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries.20 Although the 
twentieth century saw the Royal Commission on the Press21 in the UK and the 
Hutchins Commission report22 in the US, that were catalysts for the emergence of the 
social responsibility theory,23 this ‘…doctrine has always been relegated to the fringes 
                                                          
18 Abrams v United States 250 US 616 (1919), 630-631; See also Gitlow v New York 268 US 652 
(1925), 673 per Justice Holmes. 
19 E. Barendt, ‘The First Amendment and the Media’ in I. Loveland (ed), Importing the First 
Amendment: Freedom of Speech and Expression in Britain, Europe and the USA, (Hart Publishing, 
1998), 29-50, 43. See also, F. Schauer, ‘The Political Incidence of the Free Speech Principle’ (1993) 64 
U Colorado LR 935, 949-952. 
20 F. Siebert, T. Peterson and W. Schramm, Four Theories of the Press, (University of Illinois Press, 
1956), 44-45. 
21 The Royal Commission on the Press 1947-1949 was formed at the instigation of the National Union 
of Journalists. It was established ‘with the object of furthering the free expression of opinion through 
the Press and the greatest possible accuracy in the presentation of news, to inquire into the control, 
management and censorship of the newspaper and periodical Press and the news agencies, including 
the financial structure and the monopolistic tendencies in control, and to make recommendations 
thereon.’ 
22 R. Hutchins, Commission on Freedom of the Press, A Free and Responsible Press (University of 
Chicago Press, 1947). The Commission was set up in 1942 and reported in 1947. Its aim was ‘to 
examine areas and circumstances under which the press of the United States is succeeding or failing; to 
discover where freedom of expression is or is not limited, whether by government censorship pressure 
from readers or advertisers or the unwisdom of its proprietors or the timidity of its management.’ 
According to McQuail, it was created in ‘response to widespread criticism of the American newspaper 
press, especially because of its sensationalism and commercialism, but also its political imbalance and 
monopoly tendencies.’ See: D. McQuail, McQuail’s Mass Communication Theory, (5th ed, Sage, 
2005), 170-171.  
23 ibid. (McQuail); D. Weiss, ‘Journalism and Theories of the Press’ in S. Littlejohn and K. Foss (eds), 
Encyclopedia of Communication Theory Volume 2, (Sage, 2009), 574-579, 577; S. Baran and D. Davis, 
Mass Communication Theory: Foundations, Ferment and Future (7th ed, Wadsworth Publishing, 
2014), 72-74; D. Davis, ‘News and Politics’ in D. Swanson and D. Nimmo (eds), New Directions in 
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of journalism education and the newsroom.’24 This marginalisation of the social 
responsibility doctrine is certainly the case in respect of the Internet and social media 
speech. For the reasons articulated by cyber-libertarians above,25 as Dahlberg states, 
the Internet has provided the perfect environment for libertarianism and, specifically, 
the marketplace of ideas theory to flourish as it: ‘provides a space for information 
exchange and individual decision-making free of bureaucracy, administrative power 
and other restrictions of ‘real’ space.’26 Thus, it has been recognised by a number of 
scholars that libertarianism has become the de facto communication theory for the 
Internet and social media speech within Western democracies.27 This is because 
‘cyberspace is founded on the primacy of individual liberty’28 and, as a result, there 
now exists a ‘normative assumption that all nation-states should adopt a libertarian 
orientation toward their oversight of new media.’29 As a consequence, largely due to 
the influence of the argument from truth and, in particular, the marketplace of ideas, 
libertarianism remains a dominant communication theory, not just in respect of US 
free speech jurisprudence,30 but also in relation to the underlying principles of the 
Fourth Estate and, significantly, in the context of online and social media speech.31  
 
This section has established libertarianism’s dominant position as a free 
speech communication theory. The following section will argue that although this 
position may fit with the perceived ethos of The Circle and, in reality, cyber-
libertarians and social media platforms such as Facebook, as a normative framework 
it is idealistic as opposed to being realistic. It will reject the theory based on its 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Political Communication (Sage, 1990); J. McIntyre, ‘ Repositioning a Landmark: The Hutchins 
Commission and Freedom of the Press’, Critical Studies in Mass Communication (1987) 4, 95-135; F. 
Siebert, T. Peterson and W. Schramm, Four Theories of the Press, (University of Illinois Press, 1956), 
ch. 3. 
24 C. Christians, J. Ferre and P. Fackler, Good News: Social Ethics and the Press (Oxford University 
Press, 1993), 38. 
25 See Nemes above fn 6 and 7. 
26 L. Dahlberg, ‘Cyber-libertarianism 2.0: A Discourse Theory/Critical Political Economy 
Examination’ Cultural Politics (2010) 6(3), 331-356, 332-333. 
27 ibid. D. Weiss, ‘Journalism and Theories of the Press’ in S. Littlejohn and K. Foss (eds), 
Encyclopedia of Communication Theory Volume 2, (Sage, 2009), 574-579, 579. 
28 M. Kapor, ‘Where is the Digital Highway Really Going?’ (1993) Wired 1(3) 53-59. 
29 D. Weiss, ‘Journalism and Theories of the Press’ in S. Littlejohn and K. Foss (eds), Encyclopedia of 
Communication Theory Volume 2, (Sage, 2009), 574-579, 579. 
30 E. Barendt, ‘The First Amendment and the Media’ in I. Loveland (ed), Importing the First 
Amendment: Freedom of Speech and Expression in Britain, Europe and the USA, (Hart Publishing, 
1998), 29-50, 43. 
31 L. Dahlberg, ‘Cyber-libertarianism 2.0: A Discourse Theory/Critical Political Economy 
Examination’ Cultural Politics (2010) 6(3), 331-356, 332-333. 
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unsuitability for twenty-first century free speech, and the modern media. This leads in 
to the discussion at section four which sets out why the social responsibility model is 
better suited to this task. Ultimately, it will be argued that it provides a more 
appropriate normative basis for the argument from democratic self-governance that is 
an ideal philosophical foundation for free speech and the modern media. 
3. REJECTING LIBERTARIANISM 
 
Justification for the protection of freedom of expression32 and media freedom is 
underpinned by four philosophical theories. These are the: (i) argument from truth; 
(ii) marketplace of ideas;33 (iii) argument from self-fulfilment; (iv) argument from 
democratic self-governance. This philosophical foundation is apparent, to varying 
degrees, within contemporary domestic jurisprudence and that of the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR).34 For instance, the House of Lords recognised the 
existence of all of these rationales in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
ex parte Simms,35 where Lord Steyn stated the often-repeated passage36 that freedom 
of expression ‘serves a number of broad objectives’.37 
                                                          
32 As stated by Fenwick and Phillipson, freedom of expression is regarded as being one of the most 
fundamental rights. See: H. Fenwick and G. Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act 
(Oxford University Press, 2006), 12. 
33 This theory was formulated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Abrams v United States (1919) 
616, 630-631. As can be seen below, in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte 
Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 126 Lord Steyn treated Mill’s argument from truth and Justice Holmes’ 
marketplace of ideas as interchangeable. This view is supported by a number of commentators, 
including Nicol, Millar and Sharland (see A. Nicol QC, G. Millar QC & A. Sharland, Media Law and 
Human Rights, (2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2009), 2-3 [1.05]) and Schauer (see F. Schauer, Free 
Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry, (Cambridge University Press, 1982), 15-16), who treat the 
marketplace of ideas as simply a development of the argument from truth. However, in line with 
commentators such as Wragg (P. Wragg, ‘Mill’s dead dogma: the value of truth to free speech 
jurisprudence’, (2013) Public Law, Apr 363-385, 368-369) Blasi (V. Blasi, ‘Reading Holmes through 
the lens of Schauer’, (1997) 72(5) Notre Dame Law Review 1343, 1355) and Barendt (E. Barendt, 
Freedom of Speech, (2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2005), 13), this thesis treats the theories as 
distinct.  
34 According to Fenwick and Phillipson, in Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737 the 
ECtHR referred, at least implicitly, to these theories, when it stated, at [49]: ‘Freedom of expression 
constitutes one of the essential foundations of such a society, one of the basic conditions for its 
progress and for the development of every man.’ However, Fenwick and Phillipson go on to observe 
that although freedom of expression can be defended on all of these rationales, only the argument from 
democratic self-governance has been prominently employed by the ECtHR. This is discussed in more 
detail below at section 3.1: See H. Fenwick and G. Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human 
Rights Act (Oxford University Press, 2006), 39. 707-710; P. Wragg, ‘A Freedom to Criticise? 
Evaluating the Public Interest in Celebrity Gossip after Mosley and Terry (2010) 2(2) Journal of Media 
Law 295-320, 318. 
35 [2000] 2 AC 115. 
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 This section will demonstrate why the argument from truth and the 
marketplace of ideas are ill suited to support modern free speech. This analysis will 
defend the proposition set out in the previous section that, despite its dominance over 
free speech jurisprudence, libertarianism does not provide an appropriate normative 
framework. This lead into section four that argues that the social responsibility model 
is better suited to this task.  
3.1 THE ARGUMENT FROM TRUTH 
The argument from truth is located in Mill’s 19th Century essay Of the Liberty of 
Thought and Discussion.38 The overall thrust of Mill’s argument is that truth is most 
likely to emerge from totally uninhibited freedom of thought, and almost absolute 
freedom of expression.39 Consequently, thought and discussion protects individual 
liberty from its predominant threat,40 which is not ‘political oppression’,41 but ‘social 
tyranny.’42  
The argument has four facets. Firstly, the state would expose its own fallibility 
if it suppresses opinion on account of that opinion’s perceived falsity as, in fact, it 
may be true.43 Secondly, even if the suppressed opinion is objectively false, it has 
some value, as it may (and in Mill’s opinion very commonly does) contain an element 
of truth.44 Thirdly, since the dominant opinion on any given subject is rarely, or never, 
the whole truth, what remains will only appear as a result of the collision of adverse 
                                                                                                                                                                      
36 Lord Steyn’s judgment has been referred to numerous times within domestic jurisprudence. For a 
recent example see: R (On the application of Lord Carlisle of Berriew QC and others) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2014] UKSC 60 per Lord Kerr at [164]. 
37 ibid. 126. 
38 J. Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, (Oxford University Press, 1991); J. Mill, On Liberty, Essays 
on Politics and Society, in J.M. Robson (Ed), Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, (University of 
Toronto Press, 1977). Other Millian essays are of importance to the theory. When required, they are 
cited in the footnotes. 
39 J. Mill, On Liberty, Essays on Politics and Society, in J.M. Robson (Ed), Collected Works of John 
Stuart Mill, (University of Toronto Press, 1977), 225-226; P. Wragg, ‘Mill’s dead dogma: the value of 
truth to free speech jurisprudence’, Public Law. (2013), Apr, 363-385, 365; H. Fenwick and G. 
Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (Oxford University Press, 2006), 14. 
40 J. Mill, On Liberty, in J.M. Robson (Ed), Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, (University of 
Toronto Press, 1977), 229. 
41 ibid. 220 
42 ibid.  
43 See generally: E. Barendt, Freedom of Speech, (2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2005), 8; J. Mill, On 
Liberty, in J.M. Robson (Ed), Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, (University of Toronto Press, 
1977), 229-243, 258. 
44 ibid. (Mill) 229. 
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opinions.45 Finally, notwithstanding the third facet, even if the received opinion is not 
only true, but the entire truth, unless it is rigorously discussed and debated, it will not 
carry the same weight, as the rationale behind it may not be fully and accurately 
comprehended.46 Consequently, unless opinions can be frequently and freely 
challenged, by forcing those holding them to defend their views, the very meaning 
and essence of that true belief may, itself, be weakened, become ineffective, or even 
lost:47 In Mill’s words, the true belief: ‘will be held as a dead dogma, not a living 
truth.’48  
Despite Schauer’s argument that the desirability of truth within society is 
almost universally accepted,49 and the fact that this view seems to correlate with 
Jacob LJ’s obiter dicta in L’Oreal SA v Bellure NV50 that, pursuant to various 
international laws,51 ‘the right to tell – and to hear – the truth has high international 
recognition’,52 the assumption derived from the argument, that freedom of expression 
leads to truth, can be attacked on a number of fronts.53 Firstly, there is not necessarily 
a causal link between freedom of expression and the discovery of truth.54 This is 
particularly pertinent with regard to the modern media, where, via mediums such as 
social media and the Internet, anybody can express opinions or views, or disseminate 
information. Consequently, the Internet and social media in particular are saturated 
with information that is inaccurate, misleading or untrue. This issue is animated by 
the ‘fake news’ phenomenon,55 which has led to social media platforms being asked 
to deal with the proliferation of fake news on their sites,56 and the recent Cambridge 
                                                          
45 ibid. 252, 258. 
46 ibid. 258. 
47 ibid. 258; See also: P. Wragg, ‘Mill’s dead dogma: the value of truth to free speech jurisprudence’, 
Public Law (2013), Apr, 363-385, 365. 
48 ibid. 243, 258. 
49 F. Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry, (Cambridge University Press, 1982), 17; See also 
J. Feinberg, Social Philosophy, (Prentice-Hall, 1973), 26. 
50 [2010] EWCA Civ 535. 
51 Article 19 Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 19(2) International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights; Article 10(1) European Convention on Human Rights; Article 11(1) Charter of the 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union: [2010] EWCA Civ 535, [10]. 
52 [2010] EWCA Civ 535, [10]. 
53 For commentary criticising the argument from truth in relation to pornography, see: C. MacKinnon, 
Feminism Unmodified, (Cambridge University Press, 1987), 166; H. Fenwick and G. Phillipson, Media 
Freedom under the Human Rights Act (Oxford University Press, 2006), 309-407. 
54 F. Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry, (Cambridge University Press, 1982), 15. 
55 Fake news is discussed in more detail in section 3.2 relation to the marketplace of ideas. 
56 E. Klaris and A. Bedat, ‘With the Threat of Fake News, Will Social Media Platforms Become [like] 
Media Companies and Forsake Legal Protections?’ https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2016/12/21/with-
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Analytica scandal. In respect of the former, Facebook, in particular, was the subject of 
strong criticism in the wake of the US election.57 This resulted in the platform 
announcing that it will be partnering with a third-party fact-checking organisation to 
deal with the challenge of fake news.58 Arguably, the issue with fake news, and 
Facebook’s response, betrays a deeper problem for social networking platforms: 
These measures (partnering with a fact-checking organisation) clearly run counter to 
libertarian ideology yet, at the same time, Facebook is trying to maintain a grip on 
libertarian values, demonstrated by its reiteration of its commitment to ‘giving people 
a voice’ and that it ‘cannot become an arbiter of truth.’59 Thus, social media 
platforms, such as Facebook, are struggling to come to terms with a conflict between 
the reality of online speech and the libertarian values upon which they, as 
organisations, were originally founded.60 In other words, libertarianism is not 
compatible with what they have become. In the same vein, the fact that Cambridge 
Analytica harvested over 50 million user profiles without Facebook’s permission, and 
manufactured sex scandals and fake news to influence voters in elections around the 
world,61 is even more damning of libertarian ideology. The relative ease with which 
the firm breached Facebook’s data security enabled it to essentially hijack democracy, 
demonstrating that the philosophical rationales underpinning libertarianism, in the 
form of the argument from truth and marketplace of ideas, are fundamentally flawed 
and unrealistic, particularly in the context of social media speech.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
the-threat-of-fake-news-will-social-media-platforms-become-more-media-companies-and-forsake-
legal-protections-ed-klaris-and-alexia-bedat/ 21st December 2016, accessed 13th January 2018. 
57 See generally: See generally: A. Hunt and M. Gertzkow, ‘Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 
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December 2016, accessed 13th January 2018. 
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December 2016, accessed 13th January 2018. 
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Secondly, despite Jacob LJ’s dicta, there is no right to truth per se.62 Further, 
contrary to Schauer’s statement, arguably the dissemination of truth is not always a 
good thing. In some situations, the protection of other, countervailing values, should 
take precedent. Ironically, this is illustrated by the international instruments referred 
to by Jacob LJ in L’Oreal. Taking the European Convention on Human Rights as an 
example, Article 10(1) is qualified by Article 10(2), which enables expression, and 
therefore both truths and untruths, to be legitimately withheld on grounds of, inter 
alia, health or morals, national security, public safety, protecting the reputation and 
honour of private individuals, the prevention of disorder or crime and breach of 
confidence. Within the context of online and social media speech, the revenge porn 
phenomenon illustrates this dichotomy. In the UK, this offence, which exists by virtue 
of section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, was essentially created to 
combat individuals sharing, via text messages and social media, sexually explicit 
content of ex-partners without that person’s permission.63 Although the explicit 
pictures, videos and accompanying text may well be ‘true’, the dissemination of this 
content could, clearly, harm the victim’s health and morals, their reputation and 
honour and be a misuse of private information.64 Thus, as Barendt argues: ‘[i]t is not 
inconsistent to defend a ban on the publication of propositions on the ground that their 
propagation would seriously damage society, while conceding that they might be 
true.’65 
Finally, a further argument that undermines the argument from truth as a 
rationale to defend free speech claims relates to its lack of application in ECtHR case 
law; an argument that, incidentally, applies equally to the marketplace of ideas. 
Strasbourg jurisprudence is most closely aligned with the argument from democratic 
self-governance, which the ECtHR has made clear is at the core of Article 10 
ECHR.66 Of course, the UK’s courts are able to develop the concept of free speech 
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66 Lingens v Austria (1986) 8 EHRR 407; Jersild v Denmark (1995) 19 EHRR 1; L. Wildhaber, ‘The 
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domestically, so as to provide for a right that encapsulates the broader arguments for 
freedom of expression found in the argument from truth, the marketplace of ideas and 
the argument from self-fulfilment.67 Indeed, as illustrated by the judgments of Lord 
Steyn and Jacob LJ in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte 
Simms68 and L’Oreal69 respectively, the argument from truth has been employed 
domestically.70 However, in conflict with these judgments, as Wragg observes, the 
House of Lords consistently interpreted the obligation imposed on judges to take 
Strasbourg jurisprudence into account in domestic proceedings, pursuant to section 2 
of the Human Rights Act 1998, strictly, meaning that the domestic development of the 
concept of free speech in this way is hard to justify.71 For instance, in R (on the 
application of Ullah) v Special Adjudicator72 Lord Bingham stated that the ‘duty of 
the national courts is to keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves over 
time: no more, but certainly no less.’73 Consequently, domestic jurisprudence should 
‘mirror’ the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.74 According to Lord Bingham in Ullah 
failure to follow ‘clear and constant’ Strasbourg jurisprudence would be unlawful 
under section 6(1) HRA 1998,75 unless there are ‘special circumstances’76 that justify 
departure from that approach.77  Despite Lord Bingham’s judgment in Ullah being the 
subject of both judicial78 and academic79 criticism, the mirror principle remains in 
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Law 295-320, 314. 
77 P. Wragg, ‘A Freedom to Criticise? Evaluating the Public Interest in Celebrity Gossip after Mosley 
and Terry (2010) 2(2) Journal of Media Law 295-320, 314. 
78 In R (on the application of Children’s Rights Alliance for England) v Secretary of State for Justice 
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place. Thus, unless is can be persuasively argued that such ‘special circumstances’ 
exist, then surely the philosophical argument that must be applied to domestic case 
law, in line with Strasbourg jurisprudence, is the argument from democratic self-
governance as opposed to the inherently libertarian argument from truth and 
marketplace of ideas. 
3.2 THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 
In Abrams v United States80 Justice Holmes laid down the marketplace of ideas theory 
by asserting that: ‘the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market.’81 It dictates that an open and unregulated 
market, which allows for ideas to be traded through the free expression of all 
opinions, is most likely to lead to the truth and, consequently, increased knowledge.82 
Hence, the examination of an opinion within the ‘marketplace’ subjects it to a test that 
is more reliable than individual or governmental appraisal.83  
Herein lies an initial problem with the theory: it is, in essence, a variation of a 
fundamental principle of capitalism – namely the notion of a self-regulating consumer 
marketplace. Consequently, it is open to both economic and democratic 
interpretations,84 which will be considered in turn.  
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82 See generally: J. Oster, ‘Theory and Doctrine of ‘Media Freedom’ as a Legal Concept’, (2013) 5(1) 
JML 57-78, 70; J. Alonzo, ‘Restoring the Ideal Marketplace: How Recognizing Bloggers as Journalists 
Can Save the Press’, (2006) 9 NYU Journal of Legislation and Public Policy, 751, 762. 
83 F. Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry, (Cambridge University Press, 1982), 16; see 
also: J. Alonzo, ‘Restoring the Ideal Marketplace: How Recognizing Bloggers as Journalists Can Save 
the Press’ (2006) 9 NYU Journal of Legislation and Public Policy 751, 762. 
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The eighteenth century economist Adam Smith formulated the principle of the 
‘invisible hand’, or laissez-faire doctrine, guiding free consumer markets. Pursuant to 
this principle, there is no need for government regulation of markets, as an open and 
unregulated marketplace should regulate itself. Echoing Milton’s self-righting 
process, if one manufacturer charges too much for a product, or produces an inferior 
product, competitors will either charge less, or produce a higher quality product, to 
attract buyers. Thus, government interference is not required to protect consumers or 
to force manufacturers to meet consumer needs.85 According to the theory, Smith’s 
principle should be applied to the media; that is, if ideas are ‘traded’ freely within 
society, the correct or best ideas will, eventually prevail.86  
However, there are considerable difficulties in applying this logic to the 
modern media87 and, in particular, online speech. Media content is far less tangible 
than other consumer products.88 As a result, and in contrast to the consumer 
marketplace, the perceived meaning of individual media messages can vary 
depending on the respective recipient. Taking this a step further, the medium through 
which the information is communicated can also influence, not only the 
communication’s perceived meaning, but also the impact that it has on its intended 
and, potentially, non-intended audience. This point is illustrated by jurisprudence 
emanating from both the ECtHR and the US Supreme Court relating to the regulation 
of different forms of media.89 In Jersild v Denmark,90 in the context of broadcasting, 
the European Court stated: 
‘…the potential impact of the medium concerned is an important factor 
and it is commonly acknowledged that the audiovisual media have often a 
much more immediate and powerful effect than the print 
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media…conveying through images meanings which the print media are 
not able to impart.’91 
The Supreme Court has also acknowledged the significance of a medium in 
respect of the influence it can have on recipients of information. In Burstyn v 
Wilson,92 which concerned cinema regulation, the Court noted how a medium 
‘present(s) its own particular problems.’93 Similarly, in Metromedia v City of San 
Diego,94 a case relating to billboard regulation, the Court stated that each method of 
communication is a ‘law unto itself’ and, consequently, the law must respond to 
differences between media, in terms of their ‘natures, values, abuses and dangers.’95 
In FCC v Pacifica Foundation,96 which related to television broadcasting regulation, 
the Court recognised television’s immediacy, accessibility and its peculiarly pervasive 
and intrusive potential.97 Similarly, in Reno v American Civil Liberties Union98 the 
Court was of the opinion that ‘the Internet is not as invasive as radio or television’.99 
In coming to this decision, the Court relied upon the finding of the District Court that: 
 
Communications over the Internet do not invade an individual’s home or 
appear on one’s computer screen unbidden. Users seldom encounter 
content by accident … [a]lmost all sexually explicit images are preceded 
by warnings as to the content … odds are slim that a user would come 
across a sexually explicit sight by accident.100 
 
This decision is indicative of the pace at which online and social media 
communication has developed, as the findings upon which the decision is based are 
arguably at odds with current online expression, and is without doubt diametrically 
opposed to The Circle’s, albeit fictional, vision of the world. Internet 
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communications, in particular those transmitted via social media, can be invasive. To 
an extent this may be ‘allowed’ by the user of the social media platform, by virtue of 
registering with the platform and joining particular communities. However, users are 
still subject to ‘unbidden’ messages regularly appearing on their mobile telephone, 
tablet and laptop screens.101 Further, the availability of sexually explicit content has 
been proliferated by social media, and is synonymous with platforms such as 
WhatsApp and Snapchat, as demonstrated by the ‘revenge porn’ phenomenon.102  
Although these cases pre-date the advent of social media and citizen 
journalism, the concerns espoused by the ECtHR and the Supreme Court are almost 
prophetic, as they are equally as applicable, if not more pertinent, to online and social 
media expression. As acknowledged by a number of scholars, the Internet and social 
media have facilitated an audience-producer convergence,103 which has allowed for 
the circumvention of normal editorial and production processes.104 Whilst this can 
enable excellent citizen journalism, it can also breed, through the speech it conveys, 
its own ‘abuses and dangers’.105 Because social media is arguably more ‘immediate, 
pervasive and accessible’ to individuals than even television broadcasting, its 
messages have a potentially greater impact than any other medium. 
Turning now to the democratic interpretation of the theory, it has been 
suggested that discovering truth is dependent upon unregulated competition in the 
actual, as opposed to ideal marketplace.106 It has also been said that the theory dictates 
that the ideas that emanate from the competitive market are the truth, leaving nothing 
more to be said.107 Oster relies on this rationale to support his view that, because of 
the media’s power and ability to communicate via multiple channels, the theory 
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requires that the media should be subject to protection and only minimal restriction.108 
This is because this ‘privilege’ for journalists encourages the dissemination of more 
information that, sequentially, generates more valuable, truthful information. 
However, it is submitted that this reasoning is flawed, as it is the very reasons used by 
Oster to support his approach that renders the theory unsuitable to that which it has 
been applied. Indeed, according to Barendt, whatever interpretation is adopted, the 
theory ‘rests on shaky grounds,’109 which ‘appear particularly infirm in the context of 
mass media communications’110 for reasons that can be applied to both traditional and 
social media.111  
Firstly, if the assertion that one statement is stronger than another (whether 
these statements are communicated via a social media platform or by the traditional 
media) cannot be intellectually supported and defended, the notion of truth loses its 
integrity,112 as history demonstrates: falsehood frequently triumphs over truth, to the 
detriment of society.113 Secondly, in line with Habermas’ concept of ‘discourse’,  
which aims at reaching a rationally motivated consensus and is based on the 
assumption of the prevalence of reason,114 the theory assumes that recipients of the 
communication consider what they read or view within the context of the marketplace 
rationally; deciding whether to accept or reject it, based on whether it will improve 
their lifestyle, and society generally.115 As both Schauer and Barendt suggest, this 
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assumption is unrealistic.116 Both criticisms are pertinent to social media speech and 
citizen journalism, but also apply equally to the traditional media using social media 
as a source of news. For the reasons discussed in the following paragraphs, it is 
submitted that this basis of rationality makes a fallacy of the marketplace of ideas 
theory.  
 The first observation to be made about rationality is that social media 
proliferates a huge amount of information that is poorly researched or simply untrue, 
yet has the potential to, and very often does emerge as the dominant ‘view’117 
regardless of the detrimental impact this may have on society.118 In turn, the 
traditional media using social media as a source of news may regurgitate the same 
information. Arguably, this issue is amplified by the ubiquity of anonymity and 
pseudonymity on the Internet and social media, making it hard, if not impossible, for 
readers to accurately and rationally assess the veracity of the speaker.119 Thus, in 
reality, in a marketplace that contains true and untrue or misleading information in at 
least equal proportions, some of which may be published anonymously or under a 
pseudonym, it may be impossible for recipients of the communication to make a 
rational assessment of what they have read, viewed or listened to.  
This point leads on to a second observation, based on cognitive psychology 
research that, although pre-dates the advent of social media, is particularly relevant to 
social media speech, and is therefore worthy of consideration. In order to deal with 
the endless flow of information we are subjected to on a daily basis we try to fit each 
new piece of information in to a set of pre-existing cognitive structures, or schemas, 
that provide ‘simplified mental models’ of the world.120 Processing new ideas and 
information this way creates problems when people encounter information that cannot 
be processed in this manner, as they reject information that conflicts with their 
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schemas.121 According to scholars such Graber, McGuire and Peffley et al, in these 
circumstances, people are pre-disposed to deny the validity of the new information 
and, instead, reinterpret it so that it conforms to the schema within which they want 
the information to fit or, alternatively, they process it as an isolated exception.122 
Therefore, as Fajer suggests, because people interpret ambiguous reality to accord 
with their schemas, they become self-reinforcing and, in turn, more powerful as they 
are repeatedly ‘tested’ but never disconfirmed.123 This is indicative of arguments 
suggesting that the mass media are better at reinforcing existing attitudes and beliefs 
than changing them,124 as we largely ignore information that we deem irrelevant to 
our existing schemas.125 As Weinberg states, once people ‘make up their mind’ and 
‘reach closure’ on an issue, they tend to reject new information, regardless of whether 
it supports or conflicts with their views.126 Conversely, people seek out and resonate 
to information that is compatible with their schemas and will, sequentially, ‘support’ 
this information.127 In Ingber’s view, it is impossible to create a collective 
marketplace of unfettered discourse and discovery if we are constrained by our 
adherence to long-established mental patterns.128 This results in the ‘packaging’ of an 
argument determining how well it is received, as opposed to it being assessed on the 
merits of its ‘contents’.129 Consequently, because our schemas influence what ideas 
and information we are willing to accept ‘people’s social location…control[s] the 
manner in which they perceive and understand the world.’130 This research has been 
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described as having ‘distressing implications for marketplace theory’;131 it is 
submitted that it clearly reinforces the point that the marketplace of ideas’ basis of 
rationality makes a fallacy of the theory; as to the extent that our schemas constrain 
how we react to new ideas and information, the way we think is not ‘characterised by 
reason.’132 This observation is significant to social media which, due to the sheer 
amount of information it generates, and the invasive way in which it can potentially 
disseminate it, arguably only serves to amplify how we process information using pre-
exiting schemas and, in doing so, makes the issue with rationality more acute. The 
fake news phenomenon and its association with social media ‘filter bubbles’ animate 
this. Filter bubbles are created by algorithms that filter our online experiences, 
effectively placing us in echo chambers of our own beliefs,133 which means we are 
more likely to interact with content which conforms with our pre-existing views134 
and which, in turn, creates greater polarisation. Therefore, the more we interact with 
particular ‘types’ of information on social media, whether that be true or fake, the 
more of that particular ‘type’ of information we will be exposed to by virtue of the 
filter bubble. Thus, within the context of social media speech at least, as Weinberg 
declares: ‘[t]o the extent that our most basic views and values are relatively immune 
to rational argument, the marketplace metaphor seems pointless.’135 
The third and final reason why the theory is flawed relates to truth discovery. 
Although this issue is particularly pertinent to the traditional media, it is also relevant 
to citizen journalism and social media. The theory’s integrity is contingent upon the 
sincerity and truthfulness of the speaker, and therefore assumes that the marketplace 
contains expression that solely represents the views of the proponents of, for instance, 
publications or broadcasts, as opposed to being conveyed on the basis of restrictions 
such as editorial control, ownership, political bias or increased commercial revenue136 
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through advertising and/or sales.137 This may be true within the context of social 
media, where there are, in theory at least, less restrictions. Although, this is not 
always the case, as many bloggers may simply regurgitate false, bias or misleading 
information.138 In relation to the traditional media, this assumption is equally as 
unrealistic, for two reasons: firstly, many media outlets, particularly commercial ones, 
are driven by the restrictions set out above, to the detriment of investigative 
journalism. 139 Indeed, as observed by Gibbons:  
‘The liberal theory of the media appears to be influential, yet there is a 
countervailing view, supported by much evidence, that the media have a 
tendency to distort our understanding of the world…The media devote a 
relatively small part of their content to public affairs…preferring to 
emphasise entertainment more generally…Furthermore, news may be 
managed to serve the media’s interests, whether they ne the proprietor’s 
or the company’s more broadly.’140 
Thus, as Kenyon states, there is a ‘disjunction between ideas of political equality and 
economic communication markets’.141 These markets are inconsistent with 
democratic requirements as commercial media’s orientations have primarily been to 
advertisers and to audiences as consumers. 142  Consequently, research points towards 
there being a ‘narrowness of political views within major media.’143 As Baker 
acknowledges, the market-based media cannot be expected to serve audiences well as 
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citizens;144 secondly, as has been previously discussed, traditional media outlets use 
citizen journalists and social media generally as a source of news. Thus, in the same 
way that bloggers may regurgitate false or misleading information obtained, for 
instance, from the traditional media or other bloggers, the traditional media may do 
the same in respect of information obtained from social media.145  
Ultimately, libertarianism is flawed as a normative paradigm as it is based on 
the unproven assertion that the product of the media marketplace, which is only one 
out of an infinite number of potential outcomes, gains a de facto privileged status as 
the ‘truth’.146 As Schwarzlose states, this creates the ‘dilemma of libertarianism’: in 
the marketplace of ideas is it truth that survives, or is whatever survives the truth?’147 
Based on the arguments advanced in this section, it is submitted that libertarianism, as 
a normative paradigm founded upon philosophical doctrine such as the argument from 
truth and the marketplace of ideas, is unable to provide a suitably robust rejoinder to 
this ‘dilemma’, which clearly demonstrates that libertarian ideology is an inadequate 
normative framework for the modern media. The following sections will consider the 
social responsibility model as a more suitable basis for such a framework. 
4. SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY THEORY AND THE ARGUMENT FROM 
DEMOCRATIC SELF-GOVERNANCE: STANDARDS AND NORMS OF 
BEHAVIOUR AND DISCOURSE 
This section will argue that the social responsibility theory, as underpinned by the argument 
from democratic self-governance, creates a more appropriate normative and philosophical 
framework for the modern media than libertarianism that endorses a two-tiered approach to 
media expression. The theory dictates that media freedom is distinct from personal freedom 
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of expression, a view that correlates with the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.148 This distinction 
means that certain demands can be placed on media actors in performance of their duties over 
and above what would apply to individuals. Thus, as Leveson LJ acknowledges in his Inquiry 
into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press149 unlike individual expression, freedom of 
the press (and it is submitted, by extension, the wider media) is valued only instrumentally, as 
opposed to intrinsically, when it performs democratic functions with a view to developing 
commercially as a sector, such as informing the democratic process, and acting as a check and 
balance on political, corporate or individual power.150 This section will advance the notion 
that under this social responsibility/argument from democratic self-governance framework the 
enjoyment of media freedom is contingent upon the fulfilment of certain standards of 
behaviour and public discourse, or concomitant duties and responsibilities: namely the norms 
referred to in sections 4.1 and 4.2 below. Specifically, section 4.1 considers the first tier of the 
framework: behavioural norms associated with the social responsibility theory. Section 4.2 
sets out the second tier: how these norms are complemented by the argument from democratic 
self-governance in respect of the type of speech the media conveys. This will lead in to a 
discussion at section 5 on how the theory and the argument provide a more suitable 
framework for dealing with some of the issues identified in section 3 that are created by 
libertarianism and, specifically, from which to ‘hang’ a regulatory regime. 
4.1 TIER ONE: SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY THEORY AND BEHAVIOURAL 
NORMS  
Like libertarianism, the social responsibility theory is an Anglo-American concept. As 
stated in section 2, the catalyst for the emergence of the theory was two reports 
commissioned on either side of the Atlantic in the 1940s: the Royal Commission on 
the Press151 in the UK and the Hutchins Commission report152 in the US. The 
Commission’s report was particularly influential in establishing this new 
communication paradigm. Accordingly, in Baker’s view, it ‘provides the most 
influential modern account of the goals of journalistic performance’ and is virtually 
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treated as the ‘official Western view.’153 In simple terms the report laid down five 
requirements of media performance: firstly, to provide a truthful, comprehensive, and 
intelligent account of the day’s events in a context which gives them meaning, and to 
clearly distinguish fact from opinion; secondly, to be a forum for the exchange of 
comment and criticism by operating as common carriers of public discussion, even if 
this means disseminating views contrary to their own; thirdly, to project a 
representative picture of the constituent groups in society; fourthly, to be responsible 
for the presentation and clarification of the goals and values of society; fifthly, to 
provide full access to the day’s intelligence.154  
The Royal Commission and Hutchins Commission reports, and the eventual 
establishment of the theory, were born out of diminishing faith in libertarianism and 
the ‘optimistic’ notion that virtually absolute freedom and the self-righting process 
carried ‘built-in correctives’ for the media.155 Siebert et al distil the themes of 
criticism of the media at the time as follows: (i) it used its power for its own ends, 
with owners propagating their own opinions to their political and economic advantage 
at the expense of opposing views; (ii) it had been subservient to big business, with 
advertisers controlling editorial policies and content; (iii) it resisted social change; (iv) 
it was more willing to publish superficial and sensational stories than to publish 
‘significant’ stories; (v) it had endangered public morals; (vi) it invaded the privacy of 
individuals without just cause; (vii) it was controlled by an elite socioeconomic class, 
meaning that access to the industry was difficult, which consequently endangered the 
free and open marketplace of ideas.156 This disillusionment gave rise to an extreme 
anti-libertarian movement that resulted in increased pressure on the UK and US 
governments to regulate the media. Within the Hutchins Commission itself there was 
a clear divide between those who held strong libertarian views and those who 
favoured some form of media regulation, due to, in their view, the fragility of the 
marketplace of ideas theory making the media vulnerable to subversion by anti-
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democratic forces.157 These proponents of regulation were guided by a philosophy of 
public communication developed by social researchers at the University of Chicago 
during the 1940s.158 In opposing the notion of the marketplace of ideas the Chicago 
School argued that unregulated mass media served the interests of large or socially 
dominant groups. To their mind, the protection of free speech was not the same as the 
provision of free speech.159 Therefore, they wanted government regulation to play an 
‘interventionary role’ in order ‘to provide enabling structures for a healthy public 
sphere.’160 Despite the majority of the Commission having some sympathy with the 
ideas advanced by the School, they opposed any direct form of regulation, because 
they feared that this could act as a catalyst for official control of the media.161 
Consequently, a compromise came in the form of the social responsibility theory, 
which was founded on faith placed in the media by the members of the Commission, 
who emphasised that the media needed to refocus its efforts on serving the public.162  
Thus, the theory is based on the following rationale: unlike libertarianism, 
which dictates that free speech is absolute and, as a result, does not propagate duties 
and responsibilities that attach to the right to freedom of expression and media 
freedom, under social responsibility doctrine, freedom of speech carries concomitant 
responsibilities and obligations to society, employers and the market.163 If the media 
does not at least attempt to meet these behavioural norms then, as a consequence, it 
cannot benefit from the right to media freedom. The theory rests on the moral 
principle of justice,164 hence the right to free speech and media freedom must be 
balanced against the private rights of others and vital social interests: as beneficiaries 
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of the right to media freedom, the media are obligated to continually strive to preserve 
democracy165 by fulfilling essential constitutional normative functions of mass 
communication that extend beyond the mere provision of a robust marketplace of 
ideas,166 including: (i) ‘servicing the political system’ by providing information, 
discussion and debate on public affairs; (ii) ‘enlightening the public’ so as to make it 
capable of democratic self-governance by disseminating information of public 
interest; (iii) ‘protecting the rights of the individual’ by acting as the public 
watchdog.167 In fulfilling these functions the media must ensure that it: sets and 
maintains high professional standards of truth and balance and conduct; avoids the 
communication of material that may lead to or incite criminal activity; refrain from 
offending minority or marginalised groups.168 Finally, at the heart of the theory, is the 
requirement of the media to foster productive and creative ‘Great Communities’ by 
prioritising cultural pluralism by being a voice for all people, not just elite or 
dominant groups.169  
4.2 TIER TWO: SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY THEORY AND THE ARGUMENT 
FROM DEMOCRATIC SELF-GOVERNANCE: NORMS OF PUBLIC 
DISCOURSE 
Although the argument from democratic self-governance has been applied by the US 
Supreme Court and the House of Lords to defend free speech claims,170 it is most 
commonly associated with the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.171  As explained above in 
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relation to the argument from truth,172 the ECtHR has consistently placed it at the core 
of its jurisprudence on Article 10173 and, as a result, pursuant to the ‘mirror principle’, 
it should, in theory at least, be the dominant philosophical foundation for free speech 
domestically.174 Regardless of how the argument has been treated jurisprudentially in 
the US, by the ECtHR and by domestic courts, it is submitted, that along with the 
social responsibility paradigm, it is the best-suited philosophical argument to underpin 
the modern media. Indicative of the behavioural standard and norms underpinning 
social responsibility theory, set out in the previous section, the argument is based on 
the premise that the predominant purpose of freedom of expression is to protect the 
right of citizens to understand political matters in order to facilitate and enable 
societal engagement with the political and democratic process.175 Ultimately, an 
informed electorate is a prerequisite of democracy. Thus, the argument complements 
the social responsibility paradigm by setting norms, or parameters, for the type of 
speech the media can convey within the confines of media freedom.  
According to Bork, speech regarding ‘government behaviour, policy or 
personnel, whether…executive, legislative, judicial or administrative’176 was the 
original subject that was perceived as being protected by the right to freedom of 
expression.177 However, the scope of this approach was seen as being overly 
restrictive.178 Consequently, Alexander Meiklejohn, with whom this argument is now 
                                                          
172 See section 3.1. 
173 Lingens v Austria (1986) 8 EHRR 407; Jersild v Denmark (1995) 19 EHRR 1. See also: L. 
Wildhaber, ‘The Right to Offend, Shock or Disturb? Aspects of Freedom of Expression under the 
European Convention on Human Rights’ (2001) 36 Irish Jurist 17; P. Wragg, ‘A Freedom to Criticise? 
Evaluating the Public Interest in Celebrity Gossip after Mosley and Terry (2010) 2(2) Journal of Media 
Law 295-320, 314. 
174 See section 3.1 for detailed discussion of the ‘mirror principle’. 
175 See generally: Sir J. Laws, Meiklejohn, the First Amendment and Free Speech in English Law, in I. 
Loveland (ed), Importing the First Amendment, Freedom of Speech and Expression in Britain, Europe 
and the USA, (Hart Publishing, 1998), 123-137; A. Nicol QC, G. Millar QC & A. Sharland, Media Law 
and Human Rights, (2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2009), 3 [1.06]; E. Barendt, Freedom of Speech, 
(2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2005), 18 
176 R.H. Bork, ‘Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems’ (1971) 47 Indiana Law 
Journal 1, 27-28. 
177 J. Oster, ‘Theory and Doctrine of ‘Media Freedom’ as a Legal Concept’, (2013) 5(1) JML 57-78, 69 
178 ibid; D. Milo, Defamation and Freedom of Speech, (Oxford University Press, 2008), 63-64; M.R. 
Chesterman, Freedom of Speech in Australian Law: A Delicate Plant, (Ashgate Publishing, 2000), 48; 
See also: A. Kenyon, ‘Defamation and Critique: Political Speech and New York Times v Sullivan in 
Australia and England’, (2001) 25 Melbourne University Law Review 522, 539; R. Gilson and M. 
Leopold, ‘Restoring the “Central Meaning of the First Amendment”: Absolute Immunity for Political 
Libel’, (1986) 90 Dickinson Law Review 559, 574. 
  28 
primarily associated,179 argued for the substitution of political expression with the 
wider, and less restrictive notion of ‘public discussion’, relating to any matter of 
public interest, as opposed to expression linked purely to the casting of votes.180 
Meiklejohn stated that public discussion is speech which impacts ‘directly or 
indirectly, upon the issues with which voters have to deal [i.e.] to matters of public 
interest’.181 A result of this bifurcated interpretation of free speech is a two-tiered 
approach to expression:182 speech that is not in the public interest, is not protected, 
and is therefore open to restriction to protect the general welfare of society.183 In later 
writings, Meiklejohn clarified this wider view of ‘public discussion’, by stating that 
voting is merely the ‘external expression of a wide and diverse number of activities 
by means of which citizens attempt to meet the responsibilities of making 
judgments.’184 Accordingly, education, philosophy and science, literature and the arts, 
and public discussions on public issues, are activities that will educate citizens for 
self-government.185  
This public interest requirement, pursuant to the social responsibility and 
argument from democratic self-governance framework, correlates with the 
jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court, and the UK Court of Appeal, House of Lords 
and Supreme Court which have all made consistent reference to it. As Oster 
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observes,186 the courts have expressed this in a number of ways, including: ‘public 
interest’ or ‘public concern’;187 ‘of political, social or other concern to the 
community’;188 ‘influences social relations and politics on a grand scale’; or is part of 
a ‘debate about public affairs’; makes a ‘contribution to the public debate’; 
stimulating ‘political and social changes’.189 Similarly, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence 
provides rich precedent supporting the public interest requirement. It has regularly 
referred to ‘matters of general public interest’ and ‘matters of public concern’ within a 
variety of different circumstances. The principle has been applied to, amongst many 
other things: 190 national and local level political speech and reporting;191 criticism of 
public administration and justice;192 abuse of police power;193 criticisms of businesses 
and those operating businesses.194 Hence, according to the ECtHR, publishing 
material relating exclusively to private matters or on ‘tawdry allegations’ and 
‘sensational and…lurid news, intended to titillate and entertain, which are aimed at 
satisfying the curiosity of a particular readership regarding aspects of a person’s 
strictly private life’ and serving to ‘entertain’ rather than ‘educate’ is not in the public 
interest.195 Rather, echoing the criticisms of the media operating within a libertarian 
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framework discussed above, these situations referred to by the Strasbourg Court relate 
to mere entertainment, as opposed to meeting the standards or norms of public 
discourse set out on this section.  
Thus, social responsibility ideology, together with the argument from 
democratic self-governance, endorses a two-tiered approach to media expression. 
Firstly, the framework dictates that the media’s privileged protection is subject to it 
abiding by certain behavioural standards or norms, including acting ethically and in 
good faith, and publishing or broadcasting material that is based on reasonable 
research to verify the provenance of it and its sources. Incidentally, the only legal 
instruments that qualify the right to free speech with express reference to these extra 
duties and responsibilities are Article 10(2) ECHR and Article 19(3) of the 
International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Although these 
qualification clauses apply to both media and non-media entities their main purpose is 
to provide member states with a tool to combat abuses of power by the media.196 
Secondly, pursuant to the parameters, or norms, of speech set by the framework, 
public discussion should be protected. However, if the expression is not of public 
interest, it should not be afforded the same level of protection compared to that which 
is of public concern. This includes speech primarily concerned with commercial or 
financial matters,197 speech relating to private or intimate matters,198 and hate 
speech.199 
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Consequently, and in conclusion, historically, due to its reach, it was 
incumbent upon the traditional media to disseminate matters of public interest, and to 
act as the public watchdog and Fourth Estate; to provide a check and balance on 
government. As a result, the ECtHR has consistently stated that media freedom 
provides one of the best means for the public to discover and form opinions about the 
ideas and attitudes of political leaders, and on other matters of general interest, and 
that the public has a right to receive this information.200 Pursuant to the jurisprudence 
of the Strasbourg Court, the concept of media freedom grants protection to those 
operating as media beyond that afforded to non-media actors by freedom of 
expression.201 However, media actors that are subject to these privileges, beyond 
private individuals, are also subject to duties and responsibilities in excess of those 
expected of non-media entities. The reach of the media does not just enable it to fulfil 
its constitutional functions. This power can be abused in equal measure: The potential 
impact of abuse of power is far greater than that emanating from private individuals, 
as the media is not just capable of invading private lives of individuals, or damaging 
reputations, but it can also shape and mislead public opinion, as demonstrated by the 
fake news phenomenon and the Cambridge Analytica scandal discussed earlier in this 
article.202 As established in section 2 above, ‘abuse’ of this kind by the media is more 
likely if it is operating within a libertarian paradigm. Rather, the privilege afforded to 
the media, deriving from the ambit of the social responsibility theory and the 
argument from democratic self-governance, is based upon a utilitarian, 
consequentialist and functional understanding of media freedom. This means that 
within this normative and philosophical framework media actors are protected for 
disseminating matters of public interest, and operating as the public watchdog/Fourth 
Estate, and therefore fulfilling functions beneficial to society. However, this 
protection carries with it the obligation to fulfil these functions whilst behaving in a 
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way that complies with the standards and norms discussed above. If it fails to do this, 
it relinquishes its protection and may be subject to regulatory sanctions and/or 
criminal or civil liability. The following section will set out how the social 
responsibility/argument from democratic self-governance paradigm advanced in this 
paper provides a mechanism for dealing with, at least some, of these abuses. In 
particular it will consider how it justifies (and provides) a normative framework from 
which to ‘hang’ regulation of the media.   
5. CONCLUSION: HOW A NEW NORMATIVE AND PHILOSOPHICAL 
FRAMEWORK CAN RIGHT THE WRONGS OF LIBERTARIANISM 
As identified in section 2, despite the emergence of social responsibility theory, its 
historical and on-going marginalisation203 has become more acute as a result of 
libertarianism’s position as the de facto normative paradigm for Internet and social 
media expression. Consequently, some of the problems distilled by Siebert et al (as 
set out above)204 that the Royal Commission and the Hutchins Commission were set 
up to consider, and attempted to resolve, in respect of the traditional media through 
the creation of the theory, are being repeated, albeit within a modern media context. 
Through recourse to the criticisms of libertarianism and, specifically, the argument 
from truth and marketplace of ideas set out in section 3, this section will set out how 
(re)embracing social responsibility theory could go some way at least to solving these 
problems. 
 5.1.1 ‘Resistance’ to social change and the polarisation of communities: facilitating 
cultural and media plurality 
Prima facie there is no doubt that social media speech and, in particular, the advent of 
citizen journalism has in many instances facilitated social change through its 
enablement of cultural pluralism and it’s fostering of the ‘Great Communities’ 
envisaged by the Hutchins Commission. This is particularly evident in the Arab 
World and the Middle East205 where social media and citizen journalism ‘have been 
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hailed as tools for the empowerment of marginalized communities such as women 
and the youth, [and have] also brought new opportunities that have resulted in the 
breaking of the communication monopoly by those in power…’206 For example, the 
Arab Spring that began in Tunisia in December 2010 and ended in the revolution of 
14th January 2011, and has since been followed in Egypt, Libya and Syria, illustrates 
social media’s role in galvanising activists and facilitating social change.207 However, 
social media does not always stimulate social change; to the contrary, it can 
encourage social inertia. As identified above at section 3.2, filter bubbles can actively 
undermine the marketplace of ideas by entrenching people’s views. Rather than 
exposing us to new and opposing ideas and perspectives, these filter bubbles can 
create echo chambers, giving rise to what has been referred to as ‘my news, my 
world.’208 Thus, instead of being a catalyst for social change by encouraging cultural 
plurality and the galvanisation of ‘Great Communities’ filter bubbles and echo 
chambers can polarise communities, in particular already marginalised groups.209  
It is recognised that re-embracing the social responsibility theory will not 
necessarily prevent echo chambers, as arguably they are an inherent characteristic of 
online speech, regardless of the underpinning normative paradigm. However, as the 
likes of Baran and Davis and Yu and Renderos have observed social responsibility 
theory will continue to be revitalised by new and emerging technologies, such as 
social media and its facilitation of citizen journalism. 210 It is submitted that the effect 
of this could be three-fold: firstly, promotion of the underlying values of social 
responsibility theory, particularly its focus on cultural pluralism and media 
responsibility, may discourage the continued widespread implementation of filter 
bubbles which would actively reduce the amount of echo chambers we are 
inadvertently captured by; secondly, as social media and citizen journalism has the 
potential to give new strength to the social responsibility model, by virtue of its 
rationale, this rejuvenation of the theory may encourage more speech adhering to the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Technology Law 24(1) 16-40, 30; M. Castells, M. Fernandez-Ardevol, J. Qui and A. Say, Mobile 
communication and society: A global perspective (The MIT Press, 2007). 
206 N. Miladi, ‘Social Media and Social Change’ (2016) Digest of the Middle East 25(1), 36-51, 36. 
207 ibid. 37. 
208 S. Baran and D. Davis, Mass Communication Theory: Foundations, Ferment and Future (7th ed, 
Wadsworth Publishing, 2014), 81. 
209 See generally: C. Sunstein, #Republic (Princeton University Press, 2017), ch. 3. 
210 S. Baran and D. Davis, Mass Communication Theory: Foundations, Ferment and Future (7th ed, 
Wadsworth Publishing, 2014), 79; B. Yu and S. Renderos, ‘Seizing the Airwaves’ (2013) Extra! 
March: 12-13. 
  34 
theory’s values. Thus, although not solving the echo chamber issue, it will encourage 
the dissemination of, and make available, more speech that complies with standard 
and norms of public discourse set out in section 4; thirdly, as set out at 5.1.3 below, 
the social responsibility theory dictates that the government must actively promote the 
freedom of its citizens,211 which can be achieved, in part, by guaranteeing adequate 
media performance.212 Arguably, this includes the obligation to support diverse 
speech environments (in other words, ‘Great Communities’ that encourage cultural 
pluralism). More broadly, unlike libertarianism, it is submitted that the theory 
supports the notion of ‘positive’ free speech; as observed by a number of scholars,213 
and the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in Centro Europa 7 Srl v Italy, the concept 
places positive obligations on the state to ensure media plurality (in addition to its 
negative duty of non-interference).214 This is equally important in respect emerging 
technologies as it is with the traditional media as, according to Curran, Fenton and 
Freedman, the Internet and, it is submitted, by extension, social media and citizen 
journalism, is not exempt from ‘corporate dominance, market concentration, 
controlling gatekeepers, employee exploitation, manipulative rights management, 
economic exclusion through “tethered appliances” and encroachment upon the 
information commons.’215 
5.1.2 The problem with ‘rationality’: dealing with sensationalised stories, fake news, 
entrenched views and anonymous and pseudonymous speech 
In contrast to libertarianism, social responsibility theory does not accept the 
proposition that we are innately driven to search for truth and use it as a guide, and it 
is, at best, sceptical of people’s ability to think rationally, particularly in the context 
of the marketplace. It views us as being lethargic, prone to passively accepting what 
we see, hear and read and reluctant to apply reason when it does not satisfy our 
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immediate needs and desires. Consequently, as Siebert et al state, the theory perceives 
us as being ‘easy prey for demagogues, advertising pitchmen, and others who would 
manipulate [us] for their selfish ends.’216 Thus, unlike libertarian ideology, the social 
responsibility theory acknowledges the inherent flaws in our nature. In applying this 
to a modern media context, and the discussions in section 3, it recognises that we are 
vulnerable to sensationalised stories, fake news and the regurgitation of false or 
misleading information, entrenchment of views by virtue of pre-conceived schemas, 
the fact that we are largely unable to assess the veracity of anonymous and 
pseudonymous speakers and, as a result of all of this, our inability to rationally assess 
the marketplace. Consequently, it is realistic, as opposed to being idealistic.  
Significantly, it is this pragmatism that makes it a suitable framework for the 
modern media, as the operation of media freedom is based upon its standards and 
norms of behaviour and discourse set out in section 4 that facilitate effective 
democratic self-governance. Although not a panacea, this helps to protect us against 
some of the flaws and vulnerabilities in human nature outlined above, by virtue of the 
behaviours it requires. For instance it may: mean that more care is taken over source 
checking to reduce the regurgitation of false or misleading information; discourage 
the publication of sensationalised stories and encourage the dissemination of 
constitutionally valuable information; support the introduction by social media 
platforms, such as Facebook, of third-party fact checking organisations to prevent the 
dissemination of fake news; as a result it means that the audience can have more faith 
in material published anonymously and pseudonymously without having to 
compromise the identity of the speaker, and ultimately discourage such speech to the 
detriment of freedom of expression. Essentially, this normative and philosophical 
framework provides us with a more suitable platform from which to assess the 
marketplace rationally. 
5.1.3 A basis for coercive regulation? 
Undoubtedly, both the traditional media and users of social media, including citizen 
journalists, can unjustifiably damage reputations217 and invade personal privacy.218 
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The social responsibility theory and argument from democratic self-governance 
framework offers two layers of protection against this. Publications that damage 
reputation and/or invade privacy without justification will fall short of the standards 
and norms of public discourse as they would not be in the public interest. As a result, 
these publications would not qualify for protection under media freedom. 
An additional layer of protection for the rights of individuals that the 
framework supports is regulation. The Alliance of Independent Press Councils of 
Europe (AIPCE)219 is a network of national voluntary and self-regulatory media 
Councils that was formed to deal with complaints from the public about editorial 
content.220 The AIPCE’s Councils were traditionally concerned with the print and 
broadcast media but it has recently extended its remit to online versions of the 
traditional media and to bloggers and citizen journalists.  Although there is no doubt 
that the print media has, and will continue to, publish stories via traditional methods 
and online, that are morally questionable, cause reputational damage and invade 
individuals’ privacy without just cause, according to the AIPCE, complaints made by 
the public against online blogs and citizen journalists for alleged breaches of 
journalistic ethical standards to its various Councils continue to increase rapidly.221 
Thus, the AIPCE, its Councils and ultimately the public, face three problems, as set 
out in the following paragraphs.  
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Firstly, from a UK perspective, the print media is not, at present, subject to a 
compulsory or coercive regulatory regime. As a result of Leveson LJ’s Inquiry222 the 
Royal Charter on Self-Regulation of the Press created the Press Recognition Panel, a 
corporate body empowered to approve independent press regulators that fit the criteria 
imposed by the Charter. This led to the creation of two regulators: IMPRESS,223 and 
its rival, the Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO),224 which was created 
by the press industry itself. IMPRESS has the power to impose fines on its members 
who breach its code, and offers an arbitration service that settles disputes without the 
need for litigation, whereas IPSO does not. Common to both schemes is their reliance 
on members of the press to voluntarily join them. Despite the self-regulatory nature of 
IMPRESS and IPSO, there is a framework in place for a coercive regime. In light of 
Leveson LJ’s recommendations to ‘encourage’ press membership of IMPRESS, 
section 34 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 enables a court to award exemplary 
damages against any ‘relevant publisher’225 in media litigation who is not a member 
of ‘an approved regulator’. Among the requirements for an effective regulator is that 
it will have a low cost arbitration system to reduce legal costs for both claimants 
and the press. Section 40 is at the core of this ‘costs incentives regime’ as it empowers 
the court to award adverse costs against non-members of an ‘approved regulator’ by 
forcing the ‘relevant publisher’ to pay the claimant’s legal costs even if the publisher 
is successful in defending the claim, subject to certain exceptions.226 However, 
section 40 is not yet in force.227 Consequently, it remains unenforceable until it is 
activated by the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport. Thus, 
Leveson LJ’s recommendations have only been partially implemented. 
Secondly, section 40, and the abandoned amendment to the Data Protection 
Bill,228 are controversial. For example, the Daily Mail cited an opinion by Antony 
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White QC suggesting that the amendment to the Bill would violate human rights 
law.229 The press used the same argument to challenge section 40 in 2013.230 
However, these arguments are flawed. The human rights relied upon pursuant to the 
ECHR231 are all qualified rights, meaning their interference is lawful so long as it is 
justified and proportionate. It is submitted that these provisions are justified and 
proportionate, as section 40 could effectively balance the right to free speech with the 
rights of the public. This is because publishers who refuse to join an approved 
regulator deny claimants access to quick and cheap dispute resolution. Consequently, 
they should pay for that decision, which would otherwise impose costs on 
potential victims or deny them a remedy.  As Hugh Tomlinson QC states:  
‘Publishers have been given a choice that no other business or profession 
is given: they can choose whether or not to be subject to effective 
scrutiny. If they choose not to, then they must pay to ensure that victims 
have access to justice…There is no threat to press freedom or human 
rights – simply a threat to unregulated press abuse.’232  
Furthermore, section 40 is subject to exceptions to the rule that publishers who reject 
independent regulation pay whether they win or lose.  The court can refuse to follow 
it if it is “just and equitable” to make a different award.  This would apply, for 
example, if the claimant’s case was frivolous or if the claimant had refused a 
reasonable settlement.  Thus, the system retains flexibility to enable the courts to do 
justice whilst providing an incentive for publishers to join a system that gives 
claimants access to justice. 
If media actors do not join, or comply with, an approved regulatory scheme, 
that sets ethical standards, and provides an appropriate mechanism for redress, then 
curing the ‘real harm caused to real people’ by breaches of these standards creates a 
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challenge. Indeed, Leveson LJ’s findings were influenced by Baroness O’Neill’s 
evidence, who has long held the view that media freedom and individual freedom of 
expression are distinct concepts.233 Accordingly, to O’Neill, the public interest in 
press freedom: 
‘…is best construed as an interest in adequate (or better than adequate) 
standards of public communication, that allow readers, listeners and 
viewers to gain information and form judgements, as so to participate in 
social, cultural and democratic life.  A free press is a public good because 
it is needed for civic and common life’234 
According to Wragg,235 this view is representative of the claim made by social 
responsibility theorists that the media’s performance of its functions is critical to 
ensuring participation in the democratic process.236 In their view, regulation of the 
media is justified by this rationale on the basis that it protects and enhances media 
freedom, which in turn safeguards society’s interest in a healthy and functioning 
democracy. To their mind, regulation ensures that the media achieves this aim, as the 
media cannot be trusted to do so without it.237   
It is submitted that the framework advanced in this article provides a 
mechanism to deal with this challenge, as it justifies a tougher regulatory regime for 
all media actors. Unlike libertarianism, the social responsibility paradigm champions 
media self-regulation where possible, but also acknowledges that a coercive regime 
may be necessary.238 Under the theory the government must not merely allow 
freedom; it must also actively promote it, which means that when necessary the 
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government should act to protect the freedom of its citizens.239 Inherent within this 
obligation is the government’s status as the ‘residuary legatee of responsibility for an 
adequate press performance.’240 Thus, according to Hocking, if a self-regulating 
media is insufficient to provide society with the services it requires from it then the 
government is obliged to correct this by, for instance, enacting legislation to forbid 
flagrant abuses of the media which may ‘poison the wells of public opinion.’241 
Arguably, in respect of ‘relevant publishers’, section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act 
2013 would achieve this. However, the theory dictates that any government 
intervention should only occur when the ‘need is great and the stakes are high’ and 
even then it should intervene cautiously.242 As Siebert, Peterson and Schramm state, 
under the theory, ‘the government should not act with a heavy hand’ as any ‘agency 
capable of promoting freedom is also capable of destroying it.’243 
Thirdly, online news bloggers and citizen journalists rarely join the various 
self-regulatory systems that exist across Europe.244 Indeed, in his Inquiry, Leveson LJ 
stated that the Internet is an: ‘ethical vacuum…[that] does not claim to operate by 
express ethical standards, so that bloggers and others may, if they choose, act with 
impunity’245 and, specifically, ‘[b]logs and other such websites are entirely 
unregulated.’246 Consequently, cyberspace has been described as a ‘Wild West, law 
free zone.’247 As a result, those Councils that can only deal with complaints against 
their members are hamstrung when it comes to investigating complaints against non-
members. 248 In the UK this issue has not been helped by the Crime and Courts Act 
2013. As stated above, sections 34 and 40 of the Act apply to any ‘relevant publisher’. 
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According to section 41(1) a ‘relevant publisher’ is a person who, in the course of a 
business,249 publishes news-related material that is written by different authors and is 
subject to editorial control. Section 41(2) tells us that this means that a person, who 
does not have to be the publisher, has editorial or equivalent responsibility for the 
content and presentation of the material, and the decision to actually publish it. 
Crucially, section 41 seems to exclude most, if not all, citizen journalists for two 
reasons. By definition, most citizen journalists are not publishing news-related 
material ‘in the course of a business’. Moreover, citizen journalists tend to be both the 
author and publisher of their material, as opposed to publishing material ‘written by 
different authors.’  
Although Leveson LJ’s Inquiry was exclusively concerned with the print 
media his view that greater press regulation is required to prevent ‘real harm caused 
to real people’250 is equally as applicable to media actors operating online and via 
social media, including citizen journalists. Thus, it is submitted that the Crime and 
Courts Act 2013’s definition of ‘relevant publisher’ is fundamentally flawed: why 
should a traditional media actor, whether they publish material in their newspaper, or 
online, be captured by sections 34 and 40 (if it were enacted), yet a citizen journalist, 
by virtue of not publishing in the course of a business and being both the author and 
publisher of the material, not be? Surely, if a citizen journalist is acting as media they 
should then be subject to the same regulatory schemes as a traditional journalist? Data 
protection law demonstrates the inequity of this situation. Pursuant to the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (as it then was),251 the UK Supreme 
Court252 and guidance from the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO),253 
‘journalism’ has been given a very wide meaning. Thus, in The Law Society and 
others v Kordowski254 Tugendhat J held that online bloggers engaging in Internet 
journalism are able to avail themselves of the ‘special purposes’ exemption for 
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‘journalistic, literary or artistic’ purposes255 found in section 32 of the Data Protection 
Act 1998, and subsequently imported into Article 85 of the GDPR and the Data 
Protection Act 2018.256 According to the ICO, the purpose of the exemption is to 
‘safeguard freedom of expression.’257 
This is a loophole that needs to be addressed. It is submitted that adopting the 
framework advanced in this article provides normative and philosophical support for 
the Crime and Courts Act regime that achieves a fair balance between media freedom 
and the rights of the public. Unfortunately, the regime excludes what is now a large 
and important group within the modern media: citizen journalists and online bloggers. 
In the same way it does in respect of the traditional media, the framework would 
support an amendment to the relevant 2013 Act provisions to explicitly include online 
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